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ARISTOTLE’S ANALYTIC TOOLS
Mary Mulhern, Brookside Institute 
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the Eastern Division 
o f the American Philosophical Association, Baltimore, December 2007
Aristotle developed analytic tools to deal with conceptual difficulties that were 
important in his time. Some of these tools are his explicit analysis of homonymy, his 
eightfold classification of subjects and predicates and its elaboration into the 
predicaments and predicables, his syntactical analysis of ordinary language sentences, 
and his construction of a formal language for deductive and demonstrative syllogistic. 
Some of these conceptual difficulties are traceable to theories of Ideas, in which 
definitory predicates were not distinguished from non-definitory ones, as for instance in 
Hypothesis V of the Parmenides, where it is argued that the (non-existent) one is not 
equal to the others, because if it were equal, then it would both be and be like the others 
in respect of equality (161C3-5). Orders of generality were not distinguished from one 
another, which leads to infinite regress fallacies, like the Third Man. Additionally, 
relational predicates were not distinguished from non-relational ones, as at Theaetetus 
154C7-155C7, where the contradictions result from taking relatives as if they were 
definitory predicates, or, on a weaker interpretation, taking relatives for quantitative 
expressions.1
The Platonic dialogues had exemplified the logical shortcomings of the sophistic 
movement without offering much in the way of analysis of these shortcomings, and so it 
fell to Aristotle not only to catalogue the sophistic moves and to put the more dignified 
dialectic of the Academy in order and on record, but also to develop a systematic 
approach to resolving typical fallacies, not just showing that they led to undesirable 
conclusions. In order to address problems and anomalies mooted in the dialogues— 
especially homonymy as exhibited, for instance, in Euthydemus, Cratylus, and Hippias 
Minor, Aristotle devised a catégorial analysis of ordinary language, including an account 
of logical types, and a formal language that accommodated both ordinary language and 
demonstrative premisses.
Aristotle takes on several of these difficulties in the opening pages of the 
Categoriae, where he begins with a discussion of homonyma, or the equivocal in the 
Latin tradition:
'Ομώνυμα λέγεται ών όνομα μόνον κοινόν, ό δέ κατά 
τούνομα λόγος τής ουσίας ετερος, οΐον ζφον ό τε άνθροο- 
πος κα\ τό γεγραμμένον2
Homonyma is said of things of which the name only is common while the 
logos tes oasias corresponding to the name is different, as both the man 
and the portrait [have the name] animal. (Trans, mine)3
'Cf. also Parmenides 131C12 ff., on great and small, which seems to have an echo at Cat. 5b 11 ff.
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The initial position of this account of ομώνυμα signals the importance of homonymy as 
an issue and. highlights the importance of ό λόγος τής ουσίας in resolving problems of 
homonymy. It should be noted that this expression is not the same as όρος or ορισμός in 
the Tópica (I.v) and so cannot be rendered simply ‘definition’. Further, it does not 
contain τό  τί ήν είναι which figures there, so that it need not be rendered ‘essence’. 
What it does contain is ουσία, suggesting that Aristotle intends catégorial analysis, with 
its distinction of substance from accident, to be helpful in addressing problems of 
homonymy.
Next, Aristotle proceeds to distinguish what is a substance from what is 
predicated of a substance and from what inheres in a substance. This analysis begins with 
an eight-fold table (Ia20-b9), which is presented below in the order in which Aristotle 









1. S P ~I
2. S ~P I
3. ~S ~P I
4. S P I
5 S ~P ~I
6. ~s P ~I
7. ~s P I
8. ~s ~P ~I
This table offers a perspicuous arrangement of the criteria that—among όντα or 
designata—distinguish substance from accident, individual from kind, and physical
3Cat. lal-3. Latin ‘animal’ that comes directly into English emphasizes the sense of ζφ ον as ‘live’ or 
‘living’. We speak of portraits as ‘true to life’ and we call a painting of an arrangement of objects a ‘still 
life’, provided that their representation is accurate. For a discussion of this passage and its controversial 
antecedents and consequents in Greek philosophy, see J. P. Anton, “The Meaning of 
Ό  λόγος τής ουσίας in Aristotle’s Categories la,” The Monist, lii (1968), pp. 252-267; “The 
Aristotelian Doctrine of Homonyma in the Categories and its Platonic Antecedents,” Journal o f the History 
o f Philosophy, vi (1968), pp. 315-326; and “Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle’s Doctrine of Homonyma,” 
Journal o f the History o f Philosophy, vi (1969), pp. 1-18.
4 This table has appeared earlier in my “Predicaments and Predicables in Aristotle’s Metatheory”, Society 
for Ancient Greek Philosophy Annual Meeting, 15 October 2005. Scholars ordinarily find in this text only 
a four-fold division, employing but two criteria, as for instance, Ackrill has it, ‘being in something as 
subject’ and ‘being said of something as subject,’ Aristotle’s “Categories" and “De Interpretation, " 
translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill (Oxford, 1963), ad loc.\ cf. J.M.E. Moravcsik, “Aristotle on 
Predication,” Philosophical Review, Ixxvi (1967), pp. 80-96. My reasons for objecting to this view are, 
briefly: the fourth member of their division—allegedly primary substance—is characterized only 
negatively; their division recognizes “species and genera in categories other than substance,” whereas 
Aristotle {Cat. 2a 14-18) gives the names είδος and γένος exclusively to secondary substance; and their
division fails to distinguish psychic activities from accidents.
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definitory series from mental definitory series. The criteria are three: being a subject 
(υποκείμενον), being predicable (καθ’ύποκειμένου) of another subject, and being 
present in another subject (εν ύποκειμέυω).5
Of the eight possible combinations, the first six are included by Aristotle in his 
catégorial approach to homonymy. The last two Aristotle excludes. Case 7 (~S & P & I), 
an accident class name like ‘color’, has no designatum among οντα—it answers to;6 
such accident class names are merely logical constructions that help us make sense of our 
perceptions. Case 8 (~S & ~P & ~I), in which all the criteria are negative, is excluded by 
Aristotle at 2a34-35 and at 2b4-5.
Two included cases are individuals that can be named only in the subject place of 
predicative formulae. Case 5 (S & ~P & ~I) includes primary substances—“this man,” 
“this horse”—individual physical substances that are neither definitory of other subjects 
nor inhere in other subjects. Case 2 (S & ~P & I) includes instances of psychic activities, 
such-and-such grammarianship (ή τι$ γραμματική, la25-26),7 which is indivisible and 
one in number (τα άτομα κα'ι εν άριθμφ, lb6-8), corresponding to the physical 
individuals of Case 5.
If individuals in Aristotle’s arrangement are reckoned type 0, two others of his 
varieties of designata include items in types 1 through η-1, where items in type n are 
highest genera. These both are definitory themselves, that is to say that they determine 
their subjects, and, because they are secondary substances, are fit subjects for higher 
order definitory predications, whereby they are determined—Case 1 in series beginning 
with physical individuals. Case 4 in series beginning with mental individuals. Case 1 
(S & P & ~I) includes secondary substances, which define primary substances. Both 
species and genera define individuals but species does so more informatively, as man, his 
example here, is the more apt (οίκειότερον, 2b9) determination of individual men; the
5 Των όντω ν in la20 has the force of a technical term and is opposed to τω ν  λεγομένων four lines 
above: the contrast is of the designata of expressions with those expressions themselves. Aristotle’s use of 
όντα as a technical expression is no less precise for being deliberately minimal. For Aristotle, ov is a 
πολλαχώ$ λεγόμενον and unqualified ov is vacuous; it acquires meaning only when subjected to a 
catégorial sort. At Cat. Ia20, Aristotle uses όντα to refer to the designata of object language expressions 
just insofar as they are the designata of object language expressions, prescinding from other questions as to 
their status. What are fit subjects for a catégorial sort—nothing more, nothing less—these are the όντα of 
la20. Concerning the pre-categorial vacuity of ov, see C.H. Kahn, “The Greek Verb ‘To be’ and the 
Concept of Being,” Foundations o f Language, ii (1966), pp. 245-265; “Retrospect on the Verb “To Be’ and 
the Concept of Being,” in The Logic o f Being, edd. Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1986), 
pp. 1-28; and The “Parmenides” o f Plato, translated with introduction and appendices by A.E. Taylor 
(Oxford, 1934), p. 133.
Occidents cannot be subjects of any variety of predication, definitory or descriptive (An. Post. 83b 19-22). 
There are no desçriptive predications about white for Aristotle, only about white objects (Cat. 5b ad init.; 
An. Post. 83a33). Some apparently had offered color as the genus of white, as Tópica 109a ad finem 
records, but, on the Aristotelian theory, this does not amount to a definitory predication because the 
putative genus does not range over species. There are no color species because there are no grounds from 
which to derive a differentia that would distinguish white from green or purple or any other color.
7 To use Miss Anscombe’s entirely apt rendering (G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Three Philosophers 
[Ithaca, 1961], p. 8), which gives due weight, as Owen’s “a particular linguistic knowledge” does not, to 
Aristotle’s stipulation that the item in question inheres in the soul—it is someone’s competence respecting a 
point of grammar. Cf. G.E.L. Owen, “Inherence,” Phronesis, x (1965), pp. 97-105, esp. pp. 99-100.
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corresponding genus, animal, is less apt (κοινότερον, 2bl3). Species can serve as 
subjects for genera, and genera can serve as subjects for higher genera, on up to the 
highest genera, which are for Aristotle the upper limits of predication (cf. An. Post. 
82a38-b3; An. Pr. 43a25 ad fin.). Case 4 (S & P & I), items that inhere in subjects and 
can figure both as subject and as predicate are mental kinds, which define mental 
individuals. Aristotle’s example is knowledge (επιστήμη, lbl), which he says defines 
such-and-such grammarianship, the competence or expertise of some knower.
Aristotle includes two remaining cases: Case 6 (~S & P & ~I), highest genera, 
designata that never are subjects for further predication, and Case 3 (~S & ~P & I), 
instances of accidental attributes, which never define and never are subjects of definitory 
predications. Instances of accidental attributes (τό τι λευκόν, la27) inhere in bodies, as
• · · · · odistinct from mental individuals, which inhere in souls. For Aristotle, accidents are 
genuinely predicative: ‘Socrates is white’ is well-predicated, although ‘That white thing 
is Socrates’ is not (An. Pr. 43a34-35). Giving white or anything else that is not a 
secondary substance as a definition is on Aristotle’s view out of place (άλλοτρίως 
. . . άποδεδωκώς, Cat. 2b35). Accidents fail to define anything, but they are 
predicative, in a non-definitory or descriptive way, of the subjects in which they inhere.
Aristotle’s table of object language designata, because it distinguishes substance 
from accident, can be used to distinguish definitory predication, which is of substance by 
substance, from descriptive predication, which is of substance by accident. This 
distinction blocks paradoxes that arise from confusing definitory with non-definitory 
features, and thus would keep the reasoner from being led into seeking the 
αυτό καθ’αύτό of size, health, and strength, as Socrates tries to entice Simmias to do at 
Phaedo 65E-66A. Further, his table distinguishes logical types—individuals, species, and 
genera to order n—and these in two series, physical and mental. Together with explicit 
restrictions that what is predicable be of higher order than its subject (Cat. lbó-9, 2M5- 
21), the type distinction serves to block infinite regress fallacies, among them the Third 
Man, by disallowing statements about statements of the same generality. This sort by 
logical type apparently assumes an apparatus of genus, species, and differentia, since 
these are used—without apology—to illuminate predicating in Categoriae III.
In chapter IV, beginning at lb25, Aristotle continues developing his approach to 
dealing with homonymy by making his famous catégorial sort of όντα. Here he again 8
8 Scholars have often thought that ή τις γραμματική and τό  τι λευκόν were examples both intended to 
illustrate a single case and that they did not differ from one another in their logical behavior. Especially 
they have thought that τό  τι λευκόν, like ή τις γραμματική, must be άτομον και εν άριθμφ. Cf. 
Ackrill, ad loc.\ Miss Anscombe, pp. 8-9; also R.E. Allen, “Individual Properties in Aristotle’s 
Categories,” Phronesis, xiv (1969), pp. 31-39; James Duerlinger, “Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s 
Categories,” Phronesis, xv (1970), pp. 179-203; Storrs McCall, “Abstract Individuals,” Dialogue, v (1966), 
pp. 217-231; Gareth Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, “The One and the Many,” Review o f Metaphysics, xxi 
(1968), pp. 630-655; and Douglas Lewis, “Quality Individuals,” Review o f Metaphysics, xxiii (1969), pp. 
114-122. Holding that instances of accidental attributes are individual, however, leads to the paradox that 
no two objects, or, indeed, no two parts of the same object, have the same description. Various efforts have 
been made, in the articles cited, to patch this up. The problem need not arise, on the other hand, if what 
inheres in a body and what inheres in a soul are taken to be separate cases. There is an obvious sense in 
which someone’s mental acts are unique and hence able to meet Owen’s individuality criteria (pp. 99-100) 
-that individuals are wholly determinate and non-recurrent.
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points out what underlies the distinction of descriptive predication, which is of substance 
by accident, from definitory predication, which is of substance by substance. Accidents 
not only are distinguished from substances, but they get a more refined analysis of their 
own in the nine accidental predicaments. Distinguishing relation from quantity, for 
instance, blocks paradoxes like those mooted in Plato’s Theaetetus 154B-155D, where 
Socrates gets Theaetetus’ head to swim merely by pointing out that six dice although 
more than four dice are less than twelve dice.
Aristotle may have been spurred on by the irregular syntax and the paradoxes that 
it engenders displayed in the Platonic dialogues, in spite of the apparent regularity and 
modern feel of the discussion of syntax in the Sophist. This contrast has recently been 
studied by J. J. Mulhern, who spotted 11 examples of irregular syntax in the Euthydemus, 
Protagoras, and Parmenides, which he represented in the notation of modern predicate 
logic. His “Summary List of Examples” displays the 18 possible non-redundant 
sentences using the predicate variables φ and ψ, the predicate constants O and El, and the 
subject variables x and y. The 4 unremarkable sentences are not marked, the 11 examples 
from the dialogues are shown in bold face, and the 3 remaining possible irregular 
sentences, which Mulhern has not yet found, are shown in italics.
Summary List of Examples
SI. ψφ Holiness is just. S10. xE! Existence is a particular
52. φφ Holiness is holy.
53. φχ A particular thing is holy.
54. φΟ Unity is holy. S13.
55. φΕ! Existence is holy.
56. yx  A particular thing is S15.
another particular thing.
57. χφ  Holiness is a particular thing.
58. XX A particular thing is
a particular thing.
59. xO Unity is a particular thing.
thing.
SI 1. Οφ Holiness is one.
S12. Ox A particular thing is one. 
0 0  Unity is one.
S14. OE! Existence is one.
Ε!φ Holiness exists.
516. Elx A particular thing exists.
517. ElO  Unity exists.
518. ElEl Existence exists
If this syntactical approach is correct, one should find that the irregular forms are 
addressed in some way by Aristotle.9 10 Although scholars have not found that Aristotle 
does address them, since in the past they have had no reason to ask whether he did, 
Aristotle does address syntax in a way that clearly excludes these irregular forms, and he 
apparently alludes to Sophist 262C6-7. He excludes some of the irregular forms in his 
discussion of predication in the Categoriae by indicating what can be said of what and 
what cannot be said of what. Here his use of συπλοκή at the beginning of the second
9 J.J. Mulhern, “TOON ACTOJN Ο ΠΡωΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΜΙΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΣ, Spk 262C6-7: The First and 
Littlest of Sentences”, presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Philological Association, Montreal, January 2006, and published in the SAGP’s Newsletter 
2005/6.2, pp. 48-62.
10 Harold Tarrant, for instance, has raised this point, Montreal, January 2006.
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chapter (1 al 6), though his use is reformist, very likely is an allusion to the discussion 
reflected in Sophist 262C6 (ή πρώ τη  συμπλοκή) as well as to the Sophist itself in some 
form—not necessarily the form in which we have it. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the 
Sophist and Aristotle’s discussion have a common source in the Academy. Again, 
Aristotle addresses existence and unity in the Tópica, pointing out that they can be said of 
everything (121al7-18)—that is, that they are vacuous as they stand, from one 
perspective, or, from another, that they are homonymous and must pick up part of their 
content from the objects of which they are predicated.
Of the forms employing constants, Aristotle’s position here excludes all six of the 
irregular forms with O or El on the left (SI 1, SI3, SI4, SI5, SI7, and S I8) by showing 
that these items are not informative by themselves; and it requires that the two 
unremarkable cases (SI2 and SI6) be interpreted homonymously. The eight cases with O 
or El on the right (S4, S5, S9, SI0, SI3, SI4, SI7, and SI8) are ruled out by the standard 
reflected in the eight-fold classification, according to which only four kinds of things can 
be subjects and these are not among them: neither O nor El is able to have anything 
significant said directly of it in a monadic atomic sentence of the soil that the Stranger 
and Aristotle have in mind. Of the forms employing variables, Aristotle’s analysis 
excludes SI and S2 on the grounds of their having a predicate in the subject place. S7 is 
excluded on the double grounds of having a predicate in the subject place and a subject in 
the predicate place. S6 and S8 are excluded on the grounds of having a subject in the 
predicate place. And so, while Aristotle does not go through a list of these irregular forms 
as J. J. Mulhern has done, he both excludes them by his remarks on syntax and shows his 
acquaintance with the material and examples in Sophist 261D1-263D4.
If Aristotle’s predicative sort and catégorial analysis seems to have been 
prompted at least in part by this irregular syntax, his analysis of ordinary language 
sentences in the De Interpretatione seems to owe something to discussions in the Sophist 
examined a half century ago by A.N. Prior and enlarged recently by J.J. Mulhern.11 Prior 
had noticed that in the discussion of syntax at 261D1-263D4, the Eleatic Stranger 
presents an analysis of “the first and littlest sentence”—that it consists of a noun and 
verb, as ‘Theaetetus sits’—that can be symbolized φχ in modern notation and seems to 
accord pretty closely with modern notions of how monadic predications are formed. 
Mulhern has gone on to point out that Θεαίτητος κάθηται is far from being the first 
and littlest—κάθηται by itself, being an inflected Greek verb form, qualifies for the 
honor. But κάθηται, since it doesn’t tell us definitely who sits, cannot be assigned a truth 
value. Before he offered Θεαίτητος κάθηται, the Stranger had given 
άνθρωπος μανθάνει, ’man learns’, and led us through an argument that asserted that a 
sentence must be about something—τινός (262E5-6), and thus switches from the 
common noun ‘man’ to the proper one ‘Theaetetus’, and so can obtain a truth value by 
inspecting the situation—if it is the case that Theaetetus is seated, then the sentence is 
true and false if he is not. Inspection for whether even άνθρωπος τις μανθάνει— ‘a
11 A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1962), pp. 72-73; these remarks in the Sophist on syntax were 
noticed even earlier by I. M. Bochenski (Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam, 1951, p. 14), who thought that 
they were not original with Plato. Cf. Rosamund Sprague’s Appendix “Fr. Bochenski on Plato’s Logic” in 
Plato ’s Use o f Fallacy (New York, 1962), pp. 88-97.
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• 19 ·certain man learns’ can be confirmed or disconfirmed is not so easy, and when Aristotle 
constructs an argument along the same lines in De interpretatione VII, he is careful to 
use the same easily confirmable or disconfirmable predicate—‘is white’—in both 
examples: εστι λευκός άνθρωπος, 17b910, and εστι Σωκράτης λευκός, although his 
main discussion does not feature copulative verbs and pronominal adjectives. Aristotle 
also uses examples that survive almost intact from this Sophist passage—άνθρωπος in 
16al4-15, where the noun’s lack of truth-value is pointed out. In 17a40-bl, he also 
distinguishes άνθρωπος from a proper name—not that of Theaetetus in this case, since 
the mathematician died around 369, but that of Callias, who presumably was alive and 
present. The parallels, though sometimes not noticed, are striking.
Aristotle’s main discussion proceeds along lines definitely reminiscent of the 
Sophist passage but takes the discussion much further. A noun or name (όνομα) is for 
Aristotle “a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of 
which no part is significant apart from the rest” {De Int. 16al9-21). Some natural sounds, 
as those made by beasts, are significant; but none of these is a name—a conventional 
sound (συμβολον, a28). For Aristotle, a name is a noun in the nominative case, it is a 
subject, in terms of the Categoriae table; inflections of nouns are excluded because they 
do not meet this condition {De Int. 16a35-b5). A name need only have sense; Aristotle 
notes that a name may fail to refer either because it names something fictitious or 
impossible, for example, τραγέλαφος, goat-stag, at De Int. 16al7, Aristotle’s 
‘Pegasus’, in place of the Stranger’s έλαφος (262B9), or because it names something 
which might exist but does not, for example, μή όντος Σωκράτους, the non-existent 
Socrates, at Cat. 13b 17, Aristotle’s ‘the present king of France’. The Stranger mentions 
'ίππος in what seems to be a commonplace list of Academic examples (262B10), and this 
mention has an echo in a22 in Aristotle’s analysis of the meaninglessness of 'ίππος 
separated from the proper name Κάλλιππος versus its significance when separated from 
the phrase καλός 'ίππος.
A verb or predicate (‘ρήμα), for Aristotle, is:
that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of 
time . . . .  it is a sign of something said of something else . . . i.e. of 
something either predicable of or present in some other thing. {De Int.
16b6-l 1).
A verb proper indicates present time; a predicate expression referring to time other than 
the present is for Aristotle not a verb simply but a tense, one kind of πτώσις or 
inflection, of a verb {De Int. 16al6-19). No expression, no matter how complex, is a 
proposition unless it contains a verb {De Int. 17al 1-15). A noun or verb standing alone is 
well-formed to the extent that it is significant. A noun or verb standing alone, however, is 
not a sentence and has no truth-value {De Int. 16al0-19). Verbs not combined with 
subject nouns are names (ονόματα, 16b20) that may stand for states of affairs 12
12 As Mrs. Sprague notes, “’Know’ and ‘learn’ were terms which were notoriously productive of sophistical 
arguments. Cf. Theaetetus 199A, οπη τι$ χαίρει έλκων τό έπίστασθαι και μανθάνειν." Plato's Use o f 
Fallacy, p. 35, n. 19.
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(πράγματα, cf. του πράγματος, 16b23) but make no assertions about states of affairs 
unless combined with subject nouns.
A sentence (λόγος) is for Aristotle a significant utterance (φωνή σημαντική) 
whose parts have independent meaning, but only as a whole makes any affirmation or 
denial {De Int. 16b26-27). Every sentence is significant by convention, but not every 
sentence is a declarative sentence (17a3). A prayer, for instance, is a sentence, but not a 
declarative sentence, since it has no truth-value (17a5-6). Declarative sentences are the 
subject matter of logic; the study of non-declarative sentences belongs to rhetoric or 
poetry (17a6-7).
A sentence is well-formed for Aristotle—that is to say, it is a [properly] combined 
expression (λεγόμενον κατά συμπλοκήν, cf. Cat. 1 a l6-19)—if it contains a name in 
the subject place and a verb in the predicate place. A sentence with the name of an 
individual in the predicate place is ill-formed, as is any sentence with a predicate of lower 
order than its subject. Only combined expressions are true or false {Cat. 2a4-10; De Int. 
17a3-4).
The De Interpretation discussion, taken with what had been established in the 
Categoriae, brings the syntax and semantics of the Sophist to a stage in which it is useful 
for the logical analysis of ordinary language. We have in these two brief works an 
analysis of predication, dividing it into definitory and descriptive and including at least 
the germ of a theory of logical types—blocking infinite regress fallacies; a catégorial sort 
of όντα—blocking fallacies of equivocation that arise from what Ryle called category 
mistakes, which include both innocence of categories altogether and slotting things into 
the wrong category. The Categoriae discussion focusses on όντα, which are the 
conditions of Aristotle’s analysis and are the designata of the names that he supplies. In 
the Tópica, Aristotle devised a sort of products of this analysis: the predicables, which do 
not have designata among όντα, but which serve as terms in the premisses of reasoning, 
not only dialectical, as in the Tópica, but demonstrative as well. The predicables—genus, 
accident, definition, and property—may be viewed as headings for kinds of predicate 
expressions considered as actually playing roles in predicative formulae.13 They provide a 
scheme for analyzing the logical behavior of premisses in arguments. Thus the 
expressions ‘genus,’ ‘accident,’ ‘definition,’ and ‘property’ belong to the language of the 
metatheory of predication. Under the heading ‘genus’ fall predicate expressions whose 
designata are substances, under ‘accident’ fall those whose designata are accidents, and
13 The metalinguistic status of the predicables, especially of property, has not always been appreciated. 
Copi fails to recognize it when he says he will ignore Aristotle’s “intermediate category” of property, 
which he places between essence and accident. Verbeke at least places property with the other predicables, 
where it belongs, but is able to suggest only that it “signifies a necessary intelligibility, intermediate 
between that of definition and that of accident.” Irving Copi, “Essence and Accident,” Journal o f 
Philosophy, li (1954), pp. 706-719, reprinted in Aristotle: A Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. J.M.E. 
Moravcsik (Garden City, 1967), p. 151; and G. Verbeke, “La Notion de Propriété dans les Topiques,” 
Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, ed. G.E.L. Owen (Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum; 
Oxford, 1968), p. 265, translation mine. Brunschwig is nearer the mark when he writes “the predicables do 
not stand for real relations which can hold between a subject and the properties a proposition attributes to 
it,” but Barnes (p. 137) confesses that he does not understand him. Aristote, Topiques, Tome I, Livres I-IV, 
texte établi et traduit par J. Brunschwig (Paris, 1967), p. L, translation Barnes, Jonathan Barnes, “Property 
in Aristotle’s Topics,” Archiv für Geschichte derPhilosophie, lii (1970), pp. 136-155. .
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under ‘definition’ and ‘property’ fall those which do not have desígnala among the six 
varieties recognized by Aristotle.14
The syntax of ordinary language developed in the De Interpretatione differs from 
the syntax of the formal language for syllogistic reasoning in the Analytica Priora. Where 
the ordinary language syntax used a straightforward noun plus verb structure, readily 
accommodated to the modern <px notation into which Prior cast it, the Priora construction 
uses ύπάρχειν with the subject in the dative case, as
si δε γε τό A τινι τω ν  Β μή υπάρχει,
but if A does not apply to some one of the Bs (An. Pr. 25a22),
[Note here that Greek definite articles (in the neuter gender) are prefixed to the letter 
variables to indicate their grammatical role and, perhaps, to indicate that they are being 
mentioned, not used. Thus, τό  A indicates that A is nominative and singular, while 
τω ν  B indicates that B is genitive and plural, hence “of the Bs.” The demonstrative 
pronoun τινι is singular and dative, hence “to some one.”]
Although ύπάρχειν is widely used in ancient Greek, Aristotle’s constructions with 
ύπάρχειν not only strike English speakers as odd, but, as Patzig points out, their 
unnaturalness in Greek is remarked by Alexander.15 Patzig and Smith both point out that 
ύπάρχειν is artificial, in the sense of being stilted or possibly technical.16 What the 
constructions with ύπάρχειν do very effectively is to make perfectly clear which term is 
the predicate and which is the subject, a strategy that seems to have been called for by the 
previously noted irregular syntax, cavalier as it is with predicate placement.
In the Prior Analytics treatment of propositional structure, Aristotle employs a 
notation consisting at least of his basic three-term schemata of Greek capital placeholder 
letters 17 but able to be supplemented. For the three authentic figures, these schemata are 
ΑΒΓ, which we have seen in the premiss example above, ΜΝΞ, and ΠΡΣ. These 
schemata are a limiting case of schema, consisting as they do entirely of blanks, although
14 If property is metatheoretical for Aristotle and does not designate anything, the use of ‘property’ in recent 
controversy about “recurring” and “non-recurring” properties in the Categories has framed the debate in 
the wrong terms. Cf. Philip Corkum, “Parts and Properties in Aristotle’s C ategoriesSociety of Ancient 
Greek Philosophy with the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 28 December 2002, and 
“The Problem of Reclin ing Properties,” Ancient Philosophy, forthcoming.
15 In An. Pr. I in Wallies 1905, p. 54, 21-29.
16Gunter Patzig, Aristotle ’s Theoiy o f the Syllogism, trans. J. Barnes (Dordrecht, 1968), pp. 9-11 ; Robin 
Smith, trans., Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (Indianapolis, 1989), p. xviii, “quite artificial;” cf. 107, “The 
locutions ‘belongs to some,’ etc. are peculiar to Aristotle and not at all everyday Greek.” Patzig considers 
the reasons that Alexander proposes for Aristotle’s choosing such artificiality. The first is that “because in 
this way the union of the terms (συναγωγή τω ν  λόγων) is clear.” Patzig says that he does not 
understand this but refers in his note 23 to the occurrence in a logical sense in Aristotle of συναγω γή only 
in the Rhetoric (1400b26 and 1410a22), where Patzig says that “it means much the same as the logical 
proof of a proposition.” It clearly means the same in the quotation from Alexander, provided one doesn’t 
insist on rendering τω ν  λόγω ν “of the terms” as if it were τω ν  όρων, but rather ‘of the sentences’ or ‘of 
the statements.’
17 Lynn E. Rose, Aristotle’s Syllogistic (Springfield, IL, 1968), p. 23.
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of blanks in a spatially-ordered arrangement. Aristotle himself probably used connecting 
lines in his diagrams to exhibit the relations of the terms to one another, perhaps 
elaborating these into arbelus-and-triangles proof forms of the three figures, such as 
appear from Ammonius forward. In the notation that Aristotle used in diagrams, the 
connecting lines occur where he might have used inflections of ύπάρχειυ in writing or 
speech.18 The ύπάρχειν construction and thus its formal representation provide for 
quantification and modality within their propositional structure, all the while exhibiting 
that structure with the utmost clarity and allowing multiple interpretations of the 
syllogistic.
In developing the logical syntax of his syllogistic, Aristotle does not begin with 
terms and go on to build up propositions with terms and connectors. He starts by defining 
‘premiss’ (An. Pr. 24a 16):
Πρότασή μεν ουν έστι λόγος καταφατικός ή άποφατικός τίνος κατά 
τίνος· ουτος δε ή καθόλου ή εν μέρει ή άδιόριστος.
A premiss is an affirmative or negative statement of something about some 
subject. This statement may be universal or particular or indefinite, (trans. 
Tredennick)
The introduction here of indefinite (άδιόριστος) signals Aristotle’s intended multiple 
interpretations of his syllogistic, since in indefinite premisses, the operator 
ύπάρχειν is used “without reference to universal or particular”. At 24b 16, he states that 
“terms” (όροι) are that into which premisses can be analyzed—the κατηγορούμενον, 
usually translated ‘predicate,’ and the καθ’ού κατηγορεΤται, usually translated 
‘subject.’ The infinitive ύπάρχειν appears in Aristotle’s discussion of premisses, for 
example, at 24al8, where he gives a broad definition o f ‘universal’:
λέγω  δε καθόλου μεν τό παντ'ι ή μηδενι ύπάρχειν
By universal I mean applies to all, or to none (trans. Tredennick, modified)
Aristotle employs ύπάρχειν in the Analytica Priora as an operator to indicate the 
relation that terms-not objects or the designata of terms-have to one another in his 
analysis of the premisses of his syllogistic. The Analytica Priora premiss construction is 
designed to accommodate at least two interpretations—an extensional interpretation of 
syllogisms whose premisses are in the object language, but including predicates of higher 
orders of generality, and a non-extensional interpretation of syllogisms at least some of 
whose premisses are in the metalanguage
Aristotle’s choice of vocabulary for his examples serves to integrate the 
Analytica Priora analysis of propositions with that in the rest of the Organon, which 
distinguishes definitory from descriptive predication. The examples that Aristotle
18 Mary Mulhem, “Aristotle’s Formal Language”, presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association, Boston, January 2005, and published in the 
Society’s Newsletter 2004/5.1.
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supplies as values for his term variables include both definitory predicates like ‘animal’ 
and descriptive predicates like ‘white,’ which suggests that ύπάρχειν is chosen as 
neutral between these two kinds of predication and thus accommodates both of them. It is 
thus not a vague, untechnical “blanket term”19 but a technical term, used with a 
deliberately minimal meaning, so that it can be used of conditions of analysis—both 
substance and accident, in first and higher orders—and thus can be bound with 
quantifiers—and can equally well be used with terms that name products of analysis and 
thus have no referent among things and hence cannot be bound with quantifiers and are 
reckoned by Aristotle άδιόριστος.20
In the Analytica Posteriora, Aristotle gives a more detailed and refined definition 
of καθόλου than the Analytica Priora definition cited above, so as to be able to work 
with the premisses of demonstration more instructively than άδιόριστος would have
9 1  · ·allowed him to do. In 73b25-74a3, Aristotle stipulates the three conditions of this strict 
technical sense of καθόλου:
καθόλου δέ λέγω  ο αν κατά παντός τε ΰπάρχη κα'ι καθ’αύτό και ή αυτό
I call universal what belongs to every instance and in virtue of its nature as being 
itself (translation mine; note the occurrence of ύπάρχειν in both this formulation 
and the less strict definition of καθόλου at An. Pr. 24al8)
To be assigned in this strict sense of καθόλου, a predicate must be assignable in all three 
ways: κατά παντός, καθ’αύτό, and ή αυτό. Aristotle defines κατά παντός 
negatively: “whatever is not predicated of one instance but not of another, or predicated 
at one time but not at another (73a28-29, trans. Tredennick)”, and this seems to 
correspond to universal quantification as ordinarily understood. He defines καθ’αύτό, on 
the other hand, with clear reference to necessity but none to quantity or quantification:
τά  άρα λεγάμενα έπι τω ν  άπλώ ς επιστητών καθ’αΰτά ούτως ώς 
ένυπάρχειν τοΤς κατηγορουμένοις ή ένυπάρχεσθαι δι’ αυτά τέ έστι και 
εξ άνάνγκης
Thus regarding what is known without qualification, those which are called 
καθ’αΰτά as inhering in the subjects of which they are predicated or being 
inhered in by them belong to those subjects in virtue of their own nature and of 
necessity (73b 16-18, trans. mine)
The third condition, ή αυτό, Ross takes to signify that the predicate assigned “must be 
true of the subject. . .  precisely as being itself, not as being a species of a certain genus
19 Ackrill, p. 109, note ad Cat. 1 lb38.
20 Aristotle’s examples of άδιόριστος premisses are ‘contraries are studied by the same science’ and 
‘pleasure is not good’.
2‘ I have discussed these matters in detail in “Aristotle on Universality and Necessity”, Logique et Analyse, 
47 (September 1969), pp. 288-299.
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. . .  not in virtue of a generic nature which it shares with other things”.
This discussion of the strict sense of καθόλου is the first item in Aristotle’s 
discussion of the premisses from which demonstrations proceed, which he says we must 
understand. This discussion provides a further indication that modalities are built into his 
system, and it is of a piece with the distinction of secondary substance in his catégorial 
apparatus. Additionally, this advance beyond the merely enumerative universal to the 
genuine generic universal disarms the sophistic move of asking someone if he knows, for 
instance, that every triangle has the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles, 
and, when he says that he does, confronting him with a drawing of a triangle that he has 
not seen before and hence does not know.
I have tried to show that Aristotle’s explicit analysis of homonymy, his eightfold 
classification of subjects and predicates and its elaboration into the predicaments and 
predicables, his syntactical analysis of ordinary language sentences, and his construction 
of a formal language for deductive and demonstrative syllogistic are consistent pieces of 
a coherent approach designed not only to resolve the paradoxes of the sophistic and the 
Academy but also to provide secure underpinnings of discussions both in the exact 
demonstrative sciences and in the more chancy arenas of ethics and politics. I hope that it 
seems reasonable to suppose, based on this preliminary study, that what remain 
unexplored of Aristotle’s battery of analytic tools will resemble in their conception and 
motivation those which have been examined here.
22W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1965), ad 73b25-32.
